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ABSTRACT
Philosophers of different cultural traditions have written 
extensively on the nature of the human being. In the ancient 
times, Aristotle contended that human beings are not 
naturally good but are led to be good in the society through 
education. He also expounded a doctrine of the golden 
mean, a kind of middle-way philosophy, as a theory on 
how human beings learn to be good, achieve happiness and 
live the good life. In the modern times, Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau also provided some political reflections on these 
topics. Other cultures apart from the West have developed 
explanations on the nature of human beings. For instance, 
Confucianism in the East talks about the nature of human 
beings in their natural conditions and prescribes a middle-
way doctrine for the ultimate happiness of human beings 
in the society. This paper takes a comparative approach 
to understand the areas of convergence and divergence in 
the thoughts of Aristotle, Confucius and Rousseau on the 
middle-way philosophy and the natural goodness of man. 
This is necessary in order to know the points at which 
various cultures and philosophical traditions or thought 
systems in the world can connect and overlap or differ on 
certain philosophical matters.
Keywords: human nature; human goodness; Aristotle; 
Confucius; Rousseau; golden mean   
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Introduction
There are different socio-historical circumstances which 
underlie the formation, growth and development of every culture. These 
experiential circumstances are instrumental in the shaping of cultures 
and in the formation of their worldviews. The implication of this is that 
cultures across continents have different worldviews. Different worldviews 
are like separate spectacles through which every culture perceives reality. 
Consequently, the way in which a culture conceives reality informs the 
thought-system of that culture. However, these thought-systems also 
serve as guide to their daily life. Philosophy, nonetheless, is the bedrock 
or foundation of deep thought about the principles guiding cultural 
worldviews. It follows from this that every culture has its own philosophy 
which may be different from or similar to various philosophies of other 
cultures.
The phenomenon of plurality of cultures and philosophies makes 
the comparative endeavor which is the main focus of this paper plausible. 
This is so because the world, as vast as it seems to be, is also a very small 
global village which provides the basis for cross-cultural interaction and 
cross-fertilization of ideas. Following from this, the urge to understand 
other peoples, cultures and customs apart from our own has increased in 
the intellectual arena. However, it is hardly possible to understand other 
people or cultures without being acquainted with their philosophies. This 
accords in a very large degree with Bertrand Russell’s observation that 
“if we want to understand an age or a nation, we must understand its 
philosophy.”2 This is because, the experiences of a culture determine its 
worldview, its philosophy and the way it perceives reality. We cannot, 
therefore, separate philosophy from culture. This is because they are so 
inextricably interwoven. Akin Makinde buttresses this point when he 
argues that:
Insofar as everybody belongs to an age or culture, then, 
to whatever school he or she may belong, a philosopher 
is first and foremost a person of culture, a product of the 
education and belief of his society. If a philosopher in one 
culture sets a higher standard of philosophizing than some 
others in other cultures, it is because one culture sets a 
higher standard of education, belief, knowledge, moral, 
and social values than some other cultures…3
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However, this does not mean that philosophy and culture are 
the same; rather, it means that philosophy serves as an unavoidable 
backdrop, material or expression for culture. There are many and 
different philosophical doctrines and cultures in the world, nevertheless, 
if we take a comparative look at the different philosophies of the world, 
we are likely to discover both convergences and divergences. Against 
this background, this paper attempts a comparative discussion of the 
philosophies of Confucius, Aristotle and Rousseau on the doctrine of 
moderation and the natural goodness of man – focusing on the areas of 
convergence and divergence.
Aristotle on the Goodness of Man and the Doctrine of  
the Golden Mean
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, his work on morality and human 
virtue, stands out as his masterpiece. Aristotle addresses several morally-
relevant issues in this book. However, our interest focuses on his view 
on the goodness of man, and his philosophy of moderation. Concerning 
the goodness of man, there are two opposing views. On the one hand is 
the view that man is naturally or innately good. On the other hand, is the 
view that man acquires his goodness from his contact with the society 
through teaching and conscious self-development. Aristotle belongs to the 
category of scholars who uphold the view that man acquires his goodness 
through teaching and conscious self-development. Virtues, for Aristotle, 
are what determine the goodness of man. There are two classifications 
of virtues: intellectual and moral.4 These two virtues are not innate in 
human beings. The intellectual virtues can be acquired through training. 
In other words, they can be taught to people. However, the moral virtues 
cannot be taught to people – they are acquired through habituation and 
self-development. The implication of this is that human beings are not 
naturally good. Nonetheless, they have the capacity to be good if they 
are trained or if they consistently develop themselves.
In the second chapter, book two of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
asks a fundamental ethical question “how can we be good?” This question 
has always been the concern of Normative Ethicists. It connects to the 
question of how human beings can attain happiness in a society, especially 
in their relationship with their fellow human beings, and their natural 
environment. Aristotle contends that it is human action that determine 
74   Prajñā Vihāra Vol. 22 no. 1 January to June
their dispositions. That is, human actions determine the nature or the 
state of character that are produced by human beings.5 In an attempt to 
answer the question “how can we be good?” he tries to understand virtues 
or moral qualities, and how they are preserved or undermined.6 We can 
be good, Aristotle contends, if we take to the virtues and what preserves 
them. One important inference that can be made from this developmental 
approach to virtues is that human beings are not originally born good. 
Virtues, Aristotle contends, can be destroyed on the one hand by 
deficiency and on the other hand by excess. However, between excess and 
deficiency, there is a “mean.” This mean is the moderate ground between 
the vice of excess and the vice of deficiency. This is what is known as the 
Aristotelian philosophy of the middle. Accordingly, between prodigality 
and meanness, which are excess and deficiency respectively, there is a 
mean called liberality. Between fear and rashness, there is a mean called 
bravery. The “mean”, for Aristotle is what preserves moral quality. The 
“mean” ought to be sought for in our actions. The man who observes the 
mean is a virtuous man because the mean itself preserves moral quality. 
If we fail to seek the mean, we expose ourselves to two types of vices: 
the vice of deficiency and the vice of excess.7 We control our passions 
through the rational power of the soul and thereby form virtuous habits 
that lead us to spontaneously follow the middle course.
Aristotle describes the mean as a point equidistant from the 
extremes and he argues that this definition is not the same for everybody. 
The implication of this is that in spite of the differences in the various 
cultural practices of the world, there is a universal recognition of what 
constitutes the mean. However, Aristotle recognizes that within this 
universal recognition of the mean, there is what we can, for our purpose 
here, describe as relative understanding of the mean. Accordingly, Aristotle 
maintains that:
The equal is an intermediate between excess and defect. 
By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is 
equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and 
the same for all men; by intermediate relatively to us, that 
which is neither too much nor too little - and this is not one,  
nor the same for all.8
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Following Aristotle’s explanation of the mean, the quantity of food 
that will serve as a mean between gluttony and starvation for one person 
is different from the quantity that will serve as a mean for another. Virtue, 
then, for Aristotle lies in moderation. For him, it:
Is the disposition of the soul in which when it has to choose 
among actions and feelings, it observes the mean relative 
to us, this being determined by such a rule or principle as 
would take shape in the mind of a man of sense or practical 
wisdom.9
The mean does not, however, apply to everything. There are some 
actions that we cannot determine the mean. Such actions include: envy, 
malice, shamelessness, adultery, theft and murder. These actions are bad 
in themselves.10 However, even where the mean can be determined it 
remains difficult to achieve. He confesses that virtue is hard to achieve 
because it is not easy to find the middle point. Virtue requires prudence 
or phronesis. For him,
To be angry with the right person and to the right extent 
and at the right time and with the right object and in the 
right way is not easy, and it is not everyone who can do it. 
This is equally true of spending money. Hence, we infer 
that to do these things properly is rare, laudable and fine.11
He therefore outlines three major rules that can help human 
beings in their relentless effort to moderate their actions by prudence 
and achieving the middle point. Those rules include: keep away from 
that extreme which is the more opposed to the mean; note the errors into 
which we personally are most liable to fall; always particularly be on your 
guard against pleasure and pleasant things.12 Aristotle maintains that if 
we follow these three rules, it will be easier to strike a balance between 
the two extremes of excess and deficiency, which are both vices, for the 
ultimate realization of the middle ground which is the preserver of virtue.
However, it is one thing to outline the ways through which human 
beings can maintain the middle ground between the vices of excess and 
deficiency thereby threading the path of virtue and it is another thing 
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for such outlines to be practicable. Human beings, given their nature, 
are not in the position to easily follow the paths through which virtues 
can be obtained as outlined by Aristotle. This is because it is natural that 
human beings indulge themselves in either excess or deficiency because 
they naturally value pleasure than pain. Moderation can often require a 
painful level of self-denial to steer the middle-way in every action.
Confucius on the Natural Goodness of Man and the Middle Way
Confucianism is one of the fundamental ancient philosophico-
religious doctrines of the East. It embodies a whole spectrum of ideas 
ranging from political to moral, ethical and social. This school of thought 
is believed to be founded by Confucius. However, it embodies some other 
ancient Chinese teachings that predated Confucius himself. Nonetheless, 
Confucius was said to have edited and reconstructed a lot of these ancient 
teachings without the slightest consciousness that a school of thought 
would eventually encompass them. Confucius believed that human beings 
are naturally good. However, his conception of the natural goodness of 
man is in relation to the nature of man as rational creatures, different in 
kind and degree from other animals.
There are three basic texts in Confucianism: The Analects, Mencius 
and Xunzi. These three texts express different views on the natural 
goodness of man. The Analects represents the teachings of Confucius 
himself which were compiled after his death. It was written in form of 
dialogue between Confucius (who is often referred to as the Master) and 
his disciples just like Plato’s dialogues. Mencius and Xunzi are, however, 
students of Confucius with whom he had several intellectual discussions 
on the nature of morality and politics. According to Huang, Confucius 
holds the view that human nature is good. However, what makes the 
human nature good is humanity. Humanity, according to Confucius, is 
inherent in every individual human life.13 This humanity is what makes 
human beings alike in their nature and distinguishes them from beasts.14 
There are, however, some Confucians who presented a more 
elaborate view on the natural goodness of man. These are Mencius and 
Xunzi. They continued the teachings of Confucius after his death. Their 
teachings, together with the teachings of Confucius himself are referred 
to as Confucianism. While Mencius defended most of the teachings of 
Confucius, Xunzi rejected some. On the natural goodness of man, Mencius 
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argues that human beings have innate ability to be good and that it is the 
human society that corrupts human beings. According to Amine,
Mencius argues that human nature is good and only gets 
corrupted by the society. The idea of the four hearts is 
effectively meant as an illustration of the natural goodness 
of human beings...Mencius asks us to imagine a situation 
in which a child is about to fall in a well. Who would not 
feel compassion and alarm at seeing this? One feels alarm 
neither because he wanted to get in the good grace of his 
parents, nor because he wished to win the praises of his 
fellow villagers or friends, nor yet because he disliked the 
cry of the child.15
Mencius’ argument for the natural goodness of human beings is 
predicated on the ability of human beings to express pity, take responsibility 
for certain things, or care for their fellow human beings. However, this 
does not justify the natural goodness of human beings. Human beings 
learn to care for their fellow human beings and to take responsibility for 
certain actions which may not even benefit them in anyway in the human 
society. It is man’s contact with the society that implants or inculcates 
the care for fellow men in him. Besides, some other lower creatures like 
monkeys and birds demonstrate certain level of care towards their kind. 
This makes it evident that human beings are not exclusive in showing 
care to their fellow human beings. This contrasts with Mencius’ claim 
that it is the human society that corrupts human beings. In fact, Mencius 
himself recognizes that human beings persistently do what is wrong. Yet 
he claims they are naturally good. This claim seems to be contradictory.
We may raise an objection to this claim by asking that if human 
beings are naturally good, how can they be corruptible by nature? Aristotle 
for instance, seems to disagree with Mencius’ stance on the natural 
goodness of man when he argues that whatever is by nature cannot be 
taught to act otherwise. He gives examples of fire and stones –  fire, for 
him, cannot be taught to burn downward and stones cannot be taught to 
fall upward.16 The same ought to apply to human beings if we agree that 
they are products of nature. In other words, if human beings are naturally 
or innately good as Mencius claims, nothing in nature or in the society 
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ought not to have the power to corrupt them. This is because that will 
amount to being taught to act against their very nature if we are to accept 
Aristotle’s explanation.
Moreover, Xunzi argues in contrast with Mencius’ claim, that 
human beings are naturally bad. For him, human beings are born with 
a natural desire for profit, feelings of envy, hatred and fondness for the 
indulgence of the senses.17 He, nonetheless, believes that human beings 
can be good or made to be good because they possess the natural faculty 
that can understand ethical principles.18 Xunzi’s picture of the nature of 
human beings is similar to Thomas Hobbes’s conception or understanding 
of the human being in the state of nature. That is to say that human beings 
in a state of nature are in a state of war of all against all. But how plausible 
is this understanding of human nature? If human beings cannot be said 
to be naturally good, does it make sense to argue that they are naturally 
bad? Goodness and badness are polar concepts which both presuppose 
that human beings possess some innate attributes or characteristics.
However, what are the parameters for measuring or ascertaining 
that human beings innately possess one attribute and not the other? If it is 
reasonable to say that human beings are naturally bad, it is also reasonable 
to argue that they are naturally good. This is because both claims weigh 
equally. A more plausible position to adopt here is John Locke’s claim that 
the human mind is a tabula rasa at birth and that human knowledge and 
virtues are acquired from experience. If we follow this line of thought, it 
will follow that human beings are either good or bad ‘in’ society. In other 
words, the society is both influential and inflectional on the development 
of human attitude. This also seems to follow Rousseau’s argument that 
human beings are corrupted by the society. However, unlike Rousseau, this 
view does not presuppose that human beings are innately good – rather, 
it claims that they can either be good or bad in relation to the society and 
not from their prenatal or disembodied forms.
Like Aristotelianism, Confucianism also advocates the middle-
way philosophy, which enjoins human beings to strike a balance between 
two extremes. According to this principle, excesses and defects are vices. 
However, virtue lies between the two. A virtuous person, therefore, is 
a person who maintains the middle ground between excess and defect. 
Confucius says in the The Doctrine of the Mean that “let the states of 
equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will 
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prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished 
and flourish.”19 This means that if the government of the state knows 
how to strike a balance between two extremes, there will be no problem 
in government. According to Omoregbe, Confucianism is mainly an 
ethical system or moral philosophy named after its founder.20 Confucius’ 
moral philosophy is embodied in his concept of the ideal man, the perfect 
gentleman or the superman.21 Accordingly, he describes the person who 
maintains the middle ground as the superman. This is like the concept of 
Omoluabi in Yoruba culture. According to Confucius,
The superior man cultivates a friendly harmony, without 
being weak − how firm is he in his energy! He stands erect 
in the middle, without inclining to either side − how firm 
is he in his energy! When good principles prevail in the 
government of his country, he does not change from what 
he was in retirement. How firm is he in his energy! When 
bad principles prevail in the country, he maintains his course 
to death without changing − how firm is he in his energy!22
This means that anyone who cultivates the habit of maintaining 
the middle ground between two extremes is a strong and super person. 
Such a person will know what to do at the right time and he or she will 
easily adapt and do well in any situation. No circumstance can baffle such 
a person because he or she is already “super”, meaning that he or she is 
beyond ordinary human beings. Virtue, for Confucius is man’s highest 
good23 and the virtuous person is the one who maintains the middle ground 
between two extremes.  
Rousseau on the Natural Goodness of Man and Middle Philosophy 
Rousseau’s conception of the natural goodness of man is a reaction 
to the accounts of human nature presented by Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke. Hobbesian understanding of human nature depicts a hypothetical 
pre-political human society, characterized by wickedness and viciousness. 
This society is called the “state of nature.” Hobbes argues that human 
beings in the state of nature are brutish due to the inability to determine 
what was morally condemnable and commendable. As a result of this, 
human destroy themselves because of greed and self-interest. This 
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therefore makes the state of nature to the state of anarchy and uncertainty. 
Accordingly, the need for the civil society arises in order to guarantee 
the safety of lives and properties and reason suggests what Hobbes 
calls “convenient articles of peace upon which men may be drawn to 
agreement.”24
Rousseau however disagrees with Hobbes’ negative understanding 
of human beings in the state of nature. For Rousseau, human beings in their 
natural state possess natural virtue. They are peaceful, compassionate and 
good: it is the very contact with the civil society that corrupts man. This 
is evident in his popular saying that “man is born free; yet everywhere 
we find him in chains.”25 Rousseau comes up with this saying presumably 
after reflecting thoroughly on the relationship among human beings in 
the civil society and the various forms of atrocities which human beings 
have done to their fellow human beings. According to him,
The strength of a man is so exactly in proportion with his 
natural needs and his original state that, if his state alters 
and his needs increase, even by the smallest amount, the 
assistance of his fellows becomes necessary, and when 
eventually his desires embrace the whole of nature, they 
can scarcely be satisfied even with the help of humanity 
in its entirety. In this way the causes that make us wicked 
also turn us into slaves, subjugating us by corrupting us. 
Our sense of our own weakness derives not so much from 
our nature as from our cupidity; our needs bring us together 
at the same time as our passions divide us, and the more 
we become enemies to our fellow-men, the more we need 
them.26
This is to say that the original human nature is different from how 
it has been conditioned in civil society. Natural human beings in the state 
of nature according to Rousseau did not acquire more than they needed. 
This suggests immediately that they understood the principle of striking 
a balance between excess and defect. However, their social interaction, 
intercourse or relationship with fellow human beings in the society 
distorted this instinctive orientation concerning their needs and desires. 
Their capacity for self-perfection created unnecessary needs and desires. 
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Comparing and Contrasting the Thoughts of Aristotle,  
Confucius and Rousseau on Human Nature 
Having presented the views of Aristotle, Confucius and Rousseau 
on the natural goodness of man and the doctrine of the golden mean or the 
middle-way, we shall consider the areas of convergence and divergence 
among these three philosophers. Aristotle and Confucius express similar 
views on this middle-way doctrine. They both argue that excesses and 
defects are vices while virtue lies in the middle of excess and defect. In 
this respect, the middle-way doctrine is an area of convergence between 
Confucianism and Aristotelianism. Meanwhile, Rousseau simply argues 
that human beings possessed the instinct of moderation and contentment 
before coming in contact with the civil society which divested them of this 
instinct and polluted their minds with greed, discontentment, selfishness 
and incontinence.  
However, on the natural goodness of human beings, Confucius 
and Rousseau express different views from Aristotle’s. While Confucius 
argues that human beings are naturally good because they participate 
in humanity and civil society which differentiates them from beasts; 
Rousseau argues that human beings are naturally good and are corrupted 
by the civil society. Aristotle on the contrary, argues that human beings are 
not naturally good but can be made good through education. For Aristotle, 
there are two types of virtue – moral and intellectual. While intellectual 
virtue is derived and developed through teaching and learning, moral 
virtues are acquired through habit and consistent personal development. 
The implication of this is that the goodness of human beings is not innate. 
It is through their contact with the human society that human beings try 
to cultivate and develop their senses of morality and goodness.
There are two followers of Confucius that express different views 
on the teachings of their master. They are Mencius and Xunzi. Xunzi 
expresses a view similar to Aristotle’s view, while Mencius expresses a 
view similar to Rousseau’s and Confucius’ views on the natural goodness 
of human beings. Mencius argues, following Confucius and Rousseau 
that human beings are naturally good and that they are corrupted by the 
society. However, the reason he gives for the natural goodness of human 
beings is that human beings have the natural virtue of compassion towards 
one another. This is similar in a way to Confucius’ claim that humanity is 
what differentiates human beings from beasts and Rousseau’s argument 
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that the state of nature was ruled by love.
Contrasting Mencius, Confucius and Rousseau, Xunzi, who is also 
a follower of Confucius, argues that human beings are naturally bad. For 
Xunzi, human beings are born with a natural desire for profit, feelings of 
envy, hatred and fondness for the indulgence of the senses. Nonetheless, 
he argues that human beings can be good or made to be good because 
they possess the natural faculty that can understand ethical principles. 
This position corresponds with Aristotle’s claim that human beings are 
naturally self-interested and that intellectual and moral virtues can be 
acquired by human beings because they possess a natural receptacle for 
the reception of virtues. Accordingly, both Aristotle and Xunzi agree 
that human beings are not naturally good but can be made good through 
education. 
This comparison is significant because we are living in a global age 
where many different cultures and traditions are brought together. They are 
marked by differences, and yet they require searching a common ground. 
The flexibility of this philosophy of the golden mean or middle-way 
allows us to appreciate cultural difference and yet provides a framework 
to consider virtue relative to each cultural and individual experience. 
ENDNOTES
1 Augustine University, Ilara-Epe, Lagos, Nigeria. Email: hillsraelabidemi@
gmail.com
2 Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 18th Edition (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1962), 14. 
3 Akin Makinde, African Philosophy: The Demise of a Controversy, Revised 
Edition. (Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 2010), 13. 
4 Aristotle, “The Nature of Moral Virtue” In Sher, G. (Ed) Moral Philosophy: 
Selected Readings (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc, 1987), 67.
5 Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics” In Bonevac, D. (Ed.) Today’s Moral Issues: 
Classic and Contemporary Perspective Second edition (Toronto, California: Mayfield 
Publishing Company, 1996), 8.  
6 Aristotle, “The Nature of Moral Virtue” In Sher, G. (Ed) Moral Philosophy: 
Selected Readings (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc, 1987), 69.
Abidemi Israel Ogunyomi and Emmanuel Adetokunbo Ogundele  83
7 Samuel Enoch Stumpf & James Fieser, Eds. “Aristotle” In Socrates to Sartre 
and Beyond: A History of Philosophy, 7th Edition, (London: Kenneth King, 2003), 93. 
8 Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics” In Bonevac, D. (Ed.) Today’s Moral Issues: 
Classic and Contemporary Perspective Second edition (Toronto, California: Mayfield 
Publishing Company, 1996), 9.
9 Aristotle, “The Nature of Moral Virtue” In Sher, G. (Ed) Moral Philosophy: 
Selected Readings (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc, 1987), 74.
10 Samuel Enoch Stumpf & James Fierer, Eds. “Aristotle” In Socrates to Sartre 
and Beyond: A History of Philosophy, 7th Edition, (London: Kenneth King, 2003), 93.
11 Aristotle, “The Nature of Moral Virtue” In Sher, G. (Ed) Moral Philosophy: 
Selected Readings (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc, 1987), 75.
12 Ibid.
13 Yong Huang, Confucius: A Guide for the Perplexed, (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2013), 49-50
14 Ibid.
15 Loubna El Amine, Classical Confucian Political Thought: A New 
Interpretation (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), 103.
16 Aristotle, “The Nature of Moral Virtue” In Sher, G. (Ed) Moral Philosophy: 
Selected Readings (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc, 1987), 67-68.
17 Loubna El Amine, Classical Confucian Political Thought: A New 
Interpretation (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), 104.
18 Ibid. 105-106.
19 Confucius, The Doctrine of the Mean. (Blackmask Online. www.blackmask.
com, 2001), 1.
20 Joseph Omoregbe ,A Philosophical Look at Religion (Lagos: Joja Educational 
Research and Publications, 1993), 292.
21 Ibid.
22 Confucius, The Doctrine of the Mean. (Blackmask Online. www.blackmask.
com, 2001), 2.
23 Joseph Omoregbe, Comparative Religion. (Lagos: Joja Educational Research 
and Publications, 1999), 144.
24 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Edwin Curley. Ed. (Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company,1994),78.
25 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy and the Social 
Contract. (trans.) Betts, C. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 45. 
26 Ibid. 169.
84   Prajñā Vihāra Vol. 22 no. 1 January to June
REFERENCES
El Amine, Loubna. Classical Confucian Political Thought: A New 
Interpretation. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005.
Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics” In Bonevac, D. (Ed.) Today’s Moral 
Issues: Classic and Contemporary Perspective. Second Edition. 
Toronto, California: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1996.
Confucius, The Doctrine of the Mean. Blackmask Online. www.
blackmask.com, 2001.
Hobbes,Thomas. Leviathan. Edwin Curley. Ed. Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1994.
Huang, Yong. Confucius: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2013.
Makinde, Akin. African Philosophy: The Demise of a Controversy. 
Revised Edition. Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 
2010. 
Omoregbe, Joseph. A Philosophical Look at Religion. Lagos: Joja 
Educational Research and Publications, 1993.
Omoregbe, Joseph. Comparative Religion. Lagos: Joja Educational 
Research and Publications, 1999.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discourse on Political Economy and the Social 
Contract. (trans.) Betts, C. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Russell, Bertrand. History of Western Philosophy. 18th Edition. London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1962.
Aristotle, “The Nature of Moral Virtue” In Sher, G. (Ed) Moral Philosophy: 
Selected Readings New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 
1987.
Stumpf, Samuel Enoch & Fieser, James. Eds. “Aristotle” In: Socrates to 
Sartre and Beyond: A History of Philosophy. 7th Edition. London: 
Kenneth King, 2003.
